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Abstract 
 
This paper uses 1998 household level data from urban Malawi to look at the impact on 
consumption patterns of the share of total household income accruing to different individuals 
within the household. Specifically, male and female income shares and other factors which may 
influence intra-household bargaining such as education are analysed. The study finds that for some 
categories of good such as personal and household hygiene and clothing, unitary household models 
are unsuitable as intra-household relationships and differing preferences of individuals play a key 
role in consumption choices. Overall the results indicate that females favour household hygiene, 
vehicle repair and girls’ clothing while males favour male clothing. Consumption choices are 
influenced by both the income and education of the main male and female members, and crucially, 
the impact of income shares on household consumption is non-linear. 
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1. Introduction 
By 2015 all 191 members of the United Nations have pledged to meet agreed development goals. 
These include ensuring that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling; 
reducing by two thirds the mortality rates of children under 5 years; reversing the spread of AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; reducing by three quarters the maternal mortality rate and reducing by 
half the proportion of people suffering from hunger2. Clearly, in order to meet these challenging 
targets resources need to be targeted towards the correct areas. Developing country output needs to 
rise and their economies need to become more productive. 
Households in developing countries are able to choose where to spend their income based 
on their own preference structure. Where their preferences coincide with those of the United 
Nations, more resources will be targeted towards the above goals as households increase their 
expenditure on, for example health, education and agricultural production. 
However, preferences within families may differ as different categories of goods enter 
individual utility functions in different ways; some members preferring to spend more on, say, 
health, while others prefer to spend more on clothing. The weight of each member in the 
bargaining process may influence the final outcome. Understanding intra-household relationships 
may then be important in helping to meet Government (or U.N.) targets, as money can be directed 
towards those judged to spend it in the most “desirable” way. 
The first part of this study looks at the theory of household decision-making and the 
empirical results with special regards to developing countries. We then look at expenditure patterns 
in urban households in Malawi focussing particularly upon the influence which different household 
members may exert upon the decision-making process and how this may impact upon final 
outcomes. The final section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
This section aims to give a very brief overview of the competing theoretical models of household 
income and expenditure choices. We then review the empirical literature of both developing and 
developed countries paying special attention to any patterns which emerge as well as any salient 
results. 
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2.1. Theoretical Models 
Despite the fact that micro-economic theory places a great deal of emphasis on the individual, 
analyses of household expenditure in both a developed and developing country context have often 
regarded the household as a single decision-making unit. As such, traditional theoretical neo-
classical models of household expenditure choices treat the family as a single unit. This view 
however is challenged by other theoretical models that treat the household as being composed of 
heterogeneous individuals with diverse preferences3. These non-unitary models can further be 
divided into two broad approaches; the “bargaining approach” of McElroy
4
 and the “collective 
approach” of Chiappori5. 
We first present a traditional neo-classical household welfare function before showing how 
this model differs from non-unitary models. This unitary “Beckerian” type model can be 
summarised as the head of the household composed of J individuals maximising his or her utility 
subject to the household budget constraint. Expenditure can be either public (G) (household heating 
or lighting for example) or private (cj) (one person’s consumption automatically precludes another 
from consuming the same good). As shown in equation (1) such a dictatorial model allows for 
either benevolent dictatorship, where the others’ consumption plays an important role in the utility 
of the decision-maker, or extreme selfishness. An example can be found in Bergstrom’s (1989) 
beautifully-written paper, “Puzzles: Love and Spaghetti”. Here, he models a loving couple who, 
other than love, consume only one good: spaghetti. Each person’s utility function is positively 
affected by the other’s consumption of spaghetti. 
  1 1max ( ,..., , ; , )C JW u c c G θ ε=       (1) 
  s.t. budget constraint. 
where ,θ ε  represent respectively the observable and unobservable characteristics of individual 1. 
Rangel (2004) designs a model in order to test the unitary household model against 
Chiappori’s collective model (described below). Total consumption of a household is given by: 
  
1
J
j
j
C c G
=
= +∑          (2) 
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Expenditure is given by e=P′C where P and C are price and consumption vectors 
respectively and total household income is generated by wage income, wH, exogenous income, y 
and production activities (farming for example), pi: 
  
1
( )
J
j
j
I wH y pi
=
= + +∑         (3) 
The utility function of members allows for externalities (one member cares about another’s 
consumption) and selfishness. Thus the utility of j can be influenced by the consumption of other 
members: 
  1( ,..., , ; , )j j Ju u c c G θ ε=        (4) 
In a unitary model all members have identical preferences. This can be attained either 
through a Beckerian dictatorial model where one member (the head of household) makes all the 
expenditure decisions for the household, or though a Samuelson (1956) “stable consensus”-type 
model where every individual has the same utility function. In the alternative, non-unitary 
approach, individuals bargain over different allocation depending upon their personal preferences 
and power allocations of resources within the household. 
In Chiappori’s model, members agree on a Pareto-efficient allocation of public and private 
goods. Distribution of private goods is then achieved through intra-household lump-sum transfers 
to individuals who then choose their own private consumption bundle in order to maximise their 
own utility. 
The weight each individual commands in the bargaining process, µj, gives their private 
consumption. The household utility maximisation problem below shows that if all weights are set 
to zero we find ourselves again in the context of a dictatorial model where the head (modelled 
below as individual 1) makes all the decisions for the household as per equation (1). 
  
1 1 1
2
max ( ,..., , ; , ) ( , ) ( ,..., , ; , )
. . : '
J
C J j j J
j
W u c c G P I u c c G
s t e P C I
θ ε µ θ ε
=
= +
= =
∑
  (5) 
In contrast to the collective model illustrated by equation (1), where 
1
1
J
j
j
µ
=
=∑ , the 
bargaining approach favoured by McElroy (1990) specifies a model where household members 
maximise the product of their gains from belonging to the household. The Nash-bargained solution 
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is influenced by the power of each individual, which is given by his or her “threat point” or 
“reservation utility” – the maximum utility attainable outside of the household. The threat point 
depends upon what McElroy calls “extra household environmental parameters” or EEP’s such as 
the marriage market or institutional characteristics such as divorce laws and on individual 
characteristics. Thus a household may split when, for example, a child’s utility outside of the 
household, Vj, becomes great enough to assert his or her independence. The bargaining model can 
thus be specified as in Maitra and Ray (2003) as: 
  ( )1
1
,..., , ; , ( , , )
J
C j J j
j
MaxW U c c G V p Eθ ε θ
=
 = − ∏      (6) 
where the reservation utility, Vj, is a function of prices, p, a set of individual characteristics, θ , and 
a set of EEP’s, E. 
Current consensus favours a non-unitary hypothesis for households composed of more than 
one adult. However, little agreement has been reached regarding which of the alternatives is more 
pertinent6. Our analysis does not require that the demand function be generated by the “bargaining 
model” or the “collective model”. 
2.2. Main Empirical Results 
Empirical results for both developed and developing countries tend to support the non-unitary 
hypothesis. Even in countries where a unitary model should work well, such as “macho” Brazil, 
Thomas (1990) finds evidence that unearned income in the hands of different household members 
contribute differently to total household expenditure. He looks specifically at family health when 
unearned income is in the hands of mothers and fathers. Using data from the National Study on 
Household Expenditure he finds that income controlled by mothers has a beneficial impact on child 
survival probabilities and nutrient intake. Whilst both parents use unearned income to improve 
family health, the absolute impact of “female” income on child survival probability is 20 times 
greater that that for “male” income and 4 to 7 times bigger for nutrient intake. This, the author 
suggests, is because whilst both parents care about child health, this variable enters their utility 
functions differently.  
Thomas’ focus on health as being an important variable is justified by Strauss and Thomas’ 
(1998) survey on health and development. They point to the concave relationship between these 
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two variables making investment in health particularly important in developing countries where 
such investment is already low. Furthermore, these authors show evidence of a positive correlation 
between a global health variable and labour supply. This is particularly important in a developing 
country context given the high proportion of the population which agriculture supports (over 90% 
of the Malawian population are supported by agriculture, generating 45% of GDP7) and the 
consequent reliance on own-labour supply. Regular studies in developed countries affirm a 
relationship between health and educational performance
8
, the latter also being seen as a catalyst 
for economic growth in many endogenous growth models. According to Graham (2004) women’s 
education is an important factor in female mortality rates. For these reasons our own study looks at 
health expenditure. 
Katz (1995) assumes that the sources of finance of a purchase, as well as the person 
motivating the purchase are observable. Using data from rural Guatemala, she finds that husbands 
and wives tend to finance the purchases they motivate, usually related to their “sphere of 
responsibility” within the household. This is not always the case as financial and labour transfers 
(wives helping husbands farm crops for example) are made within the household. So, for example, 
certain purchases, such as family celebrations tend to be male financed but female purchased. 
Katz’s analysis suggests that husbands tend to finance agricultural equipment, housing 
repairs, land and male clothing, whilst wives tend to finance domestic technology and health care. 
These purchasing habits clearly relate to household spheres of responsibilities. 
Using South African household level data, Maitra and Ray (2003) test for different effects 
on household expenditure patterns of income accruing from different sources. In particular, they 
note that public and private transfers tend to accrue to different household members (male and 
female respectively), and that male and female-headed households tend to have different 
expenditure habits. 
One should not be surprised that different results are found for different countries since 
economic, social and historical characteristics will influence behaviour. 
The authors note that male-headed households tend to spend less on entertainment, clothing 
and child-care but more on food, education and fuel. We note briefly that this result is different 
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 See, for example, the 2002 report: “A strategy for delivering Government’s sport and physical activity objectives”, 
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from that of Thomas (1990) where “male” income is less likely to be used for nutritional purposes 
than “female” income. 
Similarly to Thomas (1990) and Katz (1995), Maitra and Ray (2003) reject the hypothesis 
of a unitary household model. 
Rangel (2004) notes that households in developing countries are often composed of 
members from several generations, and are not simply headed by two parents with children. He 
uses cross-sectional data from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey to analyse 
the effects of changes in relative prices of 11 key commodities on household expenditure habits.  
He tests the response of a change in household demand for a commodity following a change 
in its price. This demand is decomposed as per the Slutsky equation into an income and 
substitution effect. In a collective bargaining model, these responses will be adjusted by an effect 
related to each individual’s weight in the bargaining process. Similarly to Browning et al. (1994), 
Rangel (2004) notes that the Slutsky matrix will be symmetrical under the income-pooling (unitary 
household) hypothesis. That is, a change in price of a commodity will have the same impact 
regardless of the different members’ preferences. This provides a testable hypothesis. 
Rangel rejects the unitary model, but finds a number of interesting results. Firstly he notes 
that “[In] households where adult women outnumber adult men, efficient outcomes are achieved”. 
Here, “efficient outcomes” are the Pareto efficient outcomes in the allocation of resources as 
defined in Chiapppori’s model described in part 2.1 of this paper. This is not the case where males 
outnumber females. 
Rangel further finds that where adult men outnumber adult women, a household with 
greater than two adults can be effectively modelled as one with only two adults. Thus gender and 
inter-generational relations within extended families are important. He concludes that “coalitions 
are formed in 3-adult households with two adult males but not in ones with two adult females”.  
This result is important because it suggests that, in many cases, whilst a unitary household 
model is not sufficient, a dual household model may be, even where households have greater than 
two adult members. 
Rangel’s (2004) result suggesting inter-generational relationships are important is supported 
by Thomas (1994) who uses American, Brazilian and Ghanaian data to find that fathers tend to 
spend more on sons and mothers on daughters. 
Analysing twenty Sub-Saharan African countries, Morrison and Linskins (2000) find that 
mothers’ characteristics are determinant in the nutritional intake of the child. The education, media 
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access, health, activity and social situation of the mother play a critical role in the dietary habits of 
children. Since the impact of these variables is not found to be the same as for fathers’ 
characteristics, one can conclude that the mother has different preferences and chooses to spend 
income differently. As Thomas (1994), these authors find that mothers are especially concerned 
with their daughters’ welfare. 
Although, a priori, there is no reason to believe that one model should always dominate 
since household expenditure can be strongly influenced by culture various studies have consistently 
found that developed countries are also better modelled by non-unitary models. 
Using Canadian data on married couples, Browning et al. (1994) analyse expenditure on 
clothing. They suggest that clothing may be considered a public good up to a certain point after 
which it becomes a private good. That is, the clothing expenditure of one member positively enters 
the utility function of other members up to a certain threshold after which it enters with a zero 
coefficient. They find that, in a marriage, the wife receives a greater proportion of total expenditure 
as total income increases – the wife’s purchases could be regarded as luxury goods. Furthermore, 
as the wife’s income increases with respect to the husband’s, the authors find an increase in female 
clothing expenditure but no significant effect on men’s clothing expenditure. This is taken as 
evidence against income pooling hypothesis. 
Using British data, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) agree with Browning et al. (1994)’s 
rejection of the unitary household hypothesis. These authors note that the income-pooling 
hypothesis is testable following a change in U.K. policy in 1977 when child benefit was given 
directly to the mother. A change in household expenditure habits would support the idea that the 
mother had more weight in the decision-making process following this change. The unitary 
household hypothesis would thus be rejected. 
3. Data and Analysis 
This section uses the Malawian 1998 Integrated Household Survey (IHS98) to measure 
consumption of different categories of goods. Particular attention is paid to the impact of share of 
total household income accruing to the principal male and female in the household. Since the 
approximation of a “western-style” model of a household containing a nuclear family cannot be 
applied to rural households where several generations and extended family often exist as part of a 
single household, we look only at expenditure habits of urban households. The data represent well 
the breakdown of the Malawian population where less than 15% of the population is urban. Of a 
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total of over 10,000 households included on a national level, we use only 1,350 urban households, 
each with an average of just over 4 members. Following the literature, we hypothesise that 
members have different preferences and a higher share of total income increases individual j’s 
bargaining power within the household. A greater share of household income is then spent 
according to j’s preferences. So, for example, we would expect that a greater share of household 
accruing to the principal female to have an impact on household consumption choices. 
3.1. Data Issues and the Creation of Variables 
We examine consumption of 15 categories including 4 sub-categories that represent the key 
consumption patterns of urban households in Malawi. Each category is summarised in the table 
below: 
Table 1 – categories of goods used as dependent variables 
Consumption 
Share of 
Total 
Consumption Description 
Housing 11.50% Includes rent, upkeep, improvements. 
Fuel 8.50% Including for heating and cooking. 
Food 45.50%   
Education 2.10%   
Gifts 
7.10% 
Includes cash gifts and value of in-kind gifts to 
people outside the household. 
Farm 1.20%   
Health 2.00%   
Hygiene 3.40% Includes all personal and household hygiene. 
Traditional Feminine 
Domain 
2.40% 
Includes all products that may be regarded as 
being in the traditional feminine domain such as 
kitchen utensils, household products such as 
irons, linen etc. 
Clothing 7.10% 
Total clothing. The breakdown does not include 
"other clothing expenditure" meaning they do not 
sum to 7.10% 
          Clothing-Men’s 2.60% Men’s clothing. 
          Clothing-Women’s 2.20% Women’s clothing. 
          Clothing-Boys 1.10% Boys clothing. 
          Clothing-Girls 0.08% Girls clothing. 
Other 9.20% 
All other non-durable consumption including 
pensions, fines and legal fees, communication 
etc. 
 
Some of these categories deserve some discussion. Clothing is sub-divided into separate 
male and female categories following the findings in other studies which suggest that the greater 
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the mother’s share of income, the greater the consumption of women’s and girls’ clothing
9
. Due to 
the low consumption share on each category of goods which might be counted as being in the 
traditional feminine domain of household (kitchen utensils, linen etc), these goods have been 
grouped together for the analysis. For some categories, it is not immediately clear whether mothers 
or fathers will be more inclined to bias their consumption towards these items. Certain categories 
may enter their utility functions equally meaning that, for that category, the family effectively 
behaves according to the unitary model. 
Control variables include dummies for the age, occupation and education level of the 
principal male and female in the household. Total household income and a dummy to indicate 
whether a household is below the poverty line are included since households with different 
incomes are likely to exhibit different consumption patterns. Since the logs of expenditure and of 
total income are entered in each side of the regression, these coefficients may be interpreted as 
marginal propensities to consumption. The shares of total household income accruing to the head 
male and female are included, as well as their squares. We would not expect that these two 
variables to significantly differ from each other or from zero under the income pooling hypothesis. 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Of 1,350 urban households in this study, 234 are headed by females. A greater proportion of total 
consumption in female-headed households tend to be on women’s and girl’s clothes, “feminine” 
domain goods, education, personal and household hygiene and farming. Male-headed households 
consume relatively more housing, fuel, men’s clothes, appliances (not included in the regression 
since they are durable goods) and gifts. They consume a similar proportion of food (an essential) 
clothing (suggesting an overall clothing budget which is then allocated depending partly upon 
income share), and health. Vehicle upkeep is counted in the “other” category of consumption due 
to the small amount spent (less than 1%), but it is interesting to note that female-headed households 
tend to spend a greater share of their income on motor-vehicles. This may be due to differing levels 
of technical competence of men and women with females preferring to pay someone to do repairs 
whilst males may do them themselves or to do with interpersonal communication; female city-
dwellers may have more sociological need to be mobile than males, preferring to escort children to 
school in a car for example. 
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On average, females receive around 19% of the total household income. However, this 
masks huge differences across households. Over 50% of females receive no income direct to 
themselves at all, while 38% of females receive greater than 19% of income. We compare the 
consumption patterns of households where females receive over 19% with other households. 
Households where the female contribution to income is greater tend to spend a greater 
proportion of their incomes on women’s clothes; the “feminine domain”; education; vehicle 
upkeep; hygiene; gifts and farming. These households consume less fuel; men’s clothes; health and 
food. 
Some of these results confirm the previous results, going some way to confirm the idea that 
different categories of goods enter the female utility function differently to the male utility 
function. For example, consumption of goods in the traditional feminine domain, women’s 
clothing, education and motor vehicle upkeep is higher as a proportion of total consumption in both 
categories. Other categories, such as gifts now appear to be positively associated with female 
control. This could be the result of intra-household dynamics which we do not examine in this 
study. As noted by Katz (1995), intra-household labour and financial exchanges are common. 
Furthermore, as shown in the theoretical section of this paper, certain goods (including housing and 
fuel) may be regarded as public goods (within the context of the household) and the formal testing 
of different theoretical models would be necessary to disentangle the different utility functions to 
this degree. This is beyond the scope of this study. 
It is reasonable to think that females with a higher level of education may exert a greater 
influence in household consumption decisions. Around one third of adult women in this study have 
secondary education or above. For this reason, we look here at expenditure choices, comparing 
results from households where the female has at least a secondary-level of education with other 
households. 
Households with more educated females spend greater proportions of their incomes on 
housing; education, women’s and girl’s clothing; the “feminine domain” and motor vehicle upkeep. 
They spend less on fuel and men’s clothing. Theses choices could however capture the fact that 
education and income are likely to be strongly positively correlated and may capture more the 
different consumption bundles consumed by the wealthier households. 
Education for the female is positively correlated (0.36) with both her total income and the 
part she contributes to household income (0.31). Interestingly, for males, although there is positive 
correlation (0.37) between income and education, there is not a significant relationship between 
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education and the share of total household income he contributes. There is also a strong correlation 
(0.57) between the level of education of the principal male and female in the household. 
An increased level of education for females appears to reduce what McElroy (1990) calls 
the “threat point” for women. Better educated women are capable of earning higher wages, and 
thus more capable of supporting themselves outside of the marriage. This increases their bargaining 
power, and household expenditure is more likely to reflect their preferences. 
The effects on expenditure habits from having a female head of household, greater 
influence of female income and higher female education are summarised in the table below: 
Table 2 – Impact on expenditure habits of (i) female head of household, (ii) female contributing over 19% of 
total household income and (iii) female having secondary education or higher. 
Impact of following on expenditure compared to 
average (positive, negative or equal) 
Consumption 
Fem share 
above average 
Greater female 
education Female head 
Housing = + - 
Fuel - - - 
Food - = = 
Education + + + 
Gifts + - - 
Farm + + + 
Health - = = 
Hygiene + + + 
Traditional Feminine 
Domain 
+ + + 
Clothing = = = 
       Clothing-Men’s - - - 
       Clothing-Women’s + + + 
       Clothing-Boys = = = 
       Clothing-Girls = + + 
Vehicle Upkeep + + + 
 
With regards to poverty, our data do not support Chant’s (2004) affirmation that poverty is 
increasingly seen as being a “feminine problem” and that “single-parent headed households headed 
by women [are] the “poorest of the poor”. Female-headed households in urban Malawi actually 
have a slightly higher income compared with their male counterparts but this difference is not 
significantly different from zero. 
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3.3. Estimation and Results 
Since some households do not consume certain categories of good, our estimation is done using the 
Heckman two-step estimator
10
. In the first step, we estimate probits using as the dependant variable 
whether the household does or does not consume a particular category of good. In the second stage, 
we estimate a simple OLS regression with the log of expenditure on each category of good as the 
dependant variable. In order to ensure consistent estimates, we correct for potential selection bias 
by placing the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) recuperated from the probit estimation into the second 
stage regression. In each stage we estimate consumption functions for each of the 15 categories of 
good described above. The same independent variables are used in each stage. 
 The first stage regression models the probability that a household chooses to consume 
category i at all given certain characteristics: 
 
 P(Consi=1 | X=x) = Φ(Xβ)        (7) 
 
where i represents the consumption category and is equal to 1 for households that consume i and 0 
otherwise and Φ  represents the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. 
 The second stage regression is given by: 
 ( )ln ii i
i
cons X
φ
β σ ε= + +
Φ
        (8) 
where εi are iid(0,σ2) and i iφ Φ is the density function of the normal distribution divided by its 
cumulative distribution, recuperated from the first step probit estimation on the likelihood of a 
household exhibiting positive consumption of good i. 
 In both the first and second stage regression X includes the log of total household income to 
account for the fact that households with different income levels will have different consumption 
patterns. This ensures that the coefficients on income represent the marginal propensities to 
consume (MPCs) each category of good. X also includes the share of household income accruing to 
the principal male and female in the household and their squares. These are not collinear since 
there is some income (such as farming) which does not accrue to any particular member and is 
treated as general household income. Control variables include the age, education and occupation 
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of both main household members and, in the second stage, the IMR recuperated from the first stage 
probit estimation. The baseline for education is “no education”, and for occupation it is “salaried 
work”. 
We do not expect all coefficients to be significant for all consumption categories. However, 
for certain variables which could be considered to belong to the male “sphere of responsibility” we 
would expect a positive coefficient on the share the principal male contributes to total household 
income, and similarly for female “spheres of responsibility”. If the unitary model described in part 
2.1 holds, we would expect to consistently find that the coefficients on shares of total income 
accruing to the husband and wife (and their squares) to be equal zero. 
Results from both stages are reported in table 3 in the appendix. Here we summarise the 
principal results, focussing on the second-stage OLS regressions which give the consumption 
functions and the impact of income shares. 
 
Table 3 [about here] 
 
Since the OLS regressions model consumption functions, the coefficients on the log of total 
income represent household MPC and constant elasticities of consumption. Thus, the MPC food is 
0.26. 
 Concentrating initially on the signs of the coefficients on the share of income accruing to 
the main male and female in the household, we find that increasing the share of male income in 
total household income initially has a negative (and significant) impact on clothing consumption. 
Once the share of male income reaches a certain threshold however, the impact of increasing it 
further becomes positive (although the coefficient is not significant). Thus the impact changing 
income shares have on expenditure appears to be non-linear. This is in line with Phipps and Burton 
(1998) who find similar results for Canada. 
 Females tend to favour girls’ clothing. As her share of total household income increases, 
consumption of girls’ clothing will also increase. Both share of income and education level of 
household members play a role in the bargaining positions. Lower male education is correlated 
with lower consumption of girls’ while households where the female has university-level education 
consume more girls’ clothes. If the female has at least secondary education consumption of 
women’s clothes is also higher. Results from the probit regression indicate that households are 
significantly more likely to exhibit positive consumption of men’s clothing if the male’s share of 
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total household income is higher and if he is aged above 65 years. The zero MPC girls’ clothing 
but a high coefficient on the constant representing autonomous consumption suggests that girls’ 
clothing is seen as an essential good. A similar analysis suggests that women’s clothing is seen as a 
luxury good. 
 Consumption of personal and household hygiene products are strongly influenced by 
female income. As her share of household income increases, the household is likely to actually 
reduce consumption of these products. Beyond a certain threshold, it will begin to increase such 
consumption. Although not significant, males exhibit the opposite pattern, illustrated below: 
 
The turning points are calculated at 45% of income for males and 40% for females. Thus, as the 
female’s share of total income increases to 40%, the household is reducing the consumption of 
these products. As her share increases past 40% the household begins to consume more. 
 Households with men between 46 and 65 consume more health and hygiene products. 
Interestingly, the same does not hold for females in the same age group. It could be that men of this 
age are both more likely to get ill than their younger counterparts, and more likely to be in a 
position to argue for such expenditure than more elderly men and women. More female education 
positively influences consumption of hygiene products. 
 It is interesting to find that share of female income does not impact on consumption of 
goods in the traditional feminine sphere including linen and kitchen utensils. Having primary 
education impacts positively on such consumption, but increases in education after this level has no 
impact compared to the baseline of no education. It could be that females with primary education 
are less likely to work, but have greater bargaining power than their uneducated counterparts to 
encourage such consumption. We also find that households whose principal males are 
“dependants” register significantly lower consumption in this category compared to all other 
Share of income 
 accruing to male 
 accruing to female 
Change in 
Consumption 
of Hygiene 
Goods 
Figure 1: The impact of income share on 
household consumption of hygiene goods 
 17 
groups. Probit results indicate that households where the principal male is married are more likely 
to exhibit positive consumption on this category than other households. 
 With regards to housing consumption (including rent, repairs and upkeep), males and 
females exhibit similar preference structures. Whether the share or male of female income is 
increased, consumption on this category will initially decrease. As her share increases beyond 74% 
however, she will encourage an increase in housing consumption whereas the male influence will 
remain negative. 
 
 It is important to recognise that while the income-share of one is increasing, it is necessarily 
decreasing for the other. Thus, focussing on hygiene goods, we can identify three domains in the 
division of total household income illustrated in figure 3. In (1) as their share of income increases, 
both males and females are encouraging increases in consumption in this area. In (3), as their 
shares increase, both the male and female are encouraging decreasing consumption. As the male’s 
share is rising however, the female’s is decreasing, that is, in figure 1, the male is moving 
rightwards, while the female is moving leftwards. In (2), there is conflict as the female is 
contributing, through the bargaining process, to increased consumption in the domain, while the 
male is advocating decreasing consumption. 
 
Share of income 
 accruing to male 
 accruing to female 
Change in 
Consumption 
of Housing 
Male Income=0% 
Female Income=100% Female Income=0% 
Male Income=100% 
1 3 2 
Figure 3: Hygiene Consumption Related to 
Income Shares 
Figure 2: The impact of income share on 
household consumption of housing 
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Income shares and education level have no impact on health consumption. Rather, the 
male’s age appears to have a greater impact. Households with males aged between 26 and 65 spend 
more on health than those with younger or older males. The econometric results are unable to 
confirm the descriptive statistics which suggest that greater females bargaining power positively 
influence education consumption. There is in fact, some evidence from the probit regression that 
households where the female controls a greater share of income are less likely to exhibit positive 
expenditure at all in this category. 
The Mill’s Ratios are ratios are significant only in the cases of girls’ clothing and farming 
consumption. There is thus very little sample selection bias in these models. 
The results suggest that intra-household bargaining is an important factor for the 
consumption of some categories of goods, but not for others. Although income shares play a role, 
this is not the only variable that might influence bargaining power; education also plays a key role. 
The results show that preferences may be non-linear in nature and that there is some distinction 
between male and female preferences. The unitary model of household consumption is called into 
question for some categories of good, notably hygiene, clothing and gifts. Furthermore, 
Government policy must take into account the initial situation if it is to successfully influence 
household expenditure. 
4.1. Conclusions 
Although the unitary model of household bargaining may be a good approximation in some 
circumstances it is not necessarily the best framework in which to analysis household expenditure 
patterns. Our results demonstrate that males and females have different preferences with regards to 
consumption of some categories of good. Thus the share of total income accruing to different 
members and education levels of different members can influence the consumption habits of the 
household. Although these results do not support any particular non-unitary model, they do 
indicate that households do not always act as a single unit. 
The results have clear implications for Government policy. Different household members 
prefer to spend money in different ways. A Government can thus influence household consumption 
habits by designing policies which increase a particular member’s share of income while leaving 
total household income unchanged. One such example can be found in the U.K. when, in 1978, the 
British Government redirected child support payments directly to the mother. Authors analysing 
these results have found a change in household consumption habits following this change. 
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Governments can thus use redistributive policies to redirect money to particular household 
members whose preferences are close to their own policy objectives. This may involve redirecting 
money towards, say, mothers when child nutrition in seen as being an important area to target, or 
towards fathers when agriculture is viewed as being an important area to develop. Money may even 
be redistributed directly to children as currently happens in the U.K. and Norway where newly-
born children are given an account and money by the Government. (These are known as “baby-
bonds” in the U.K.) 
Other policies that may be considered include the subsidising of child-care to allow females 
to participate more easily in the labour market, so raising their share of total household income. Or, 
in developing countries, subsidising agricultural products to increase male share of income. 
Our own results are unusual in that they show that the impact on consumption increases in 
both “male” and “female” share of income is non-linear. Thus an initial increase in the part of 
income accruing to the female has the effect of decreasing hygiene consumption. After a certain 
threshold however, efforts to further increase the female’s share of income will actually have the 
effect of increasing consumption of hygiene products. 
With different non-linear preferences, a family may be at a point where increasing the share 
of income of either the male or the female will have the same effect. In these cases, the impact 
Government policy can have is very limited and efforts to influence household expenditure choices 
will be ineffective and potentially costly. 
In order to analyse the impact of changing compositions of household income, these results 
show that a non-unitary model is useful. Furthermore, a Government wishing to influence 
household expenditure must recognise the diversity amongst members, and the impact this can 
have on expenditure patterns. 
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Appendix 
Table3a: Second Stage Regressions: OLS with Dependent Variables the Logs of household expenditure on each 
category. 
  
Clothing 
(Total) 
Men's 
Clothing 
Women's 
Clothing 
Girls' 
Clothing 
Boy's 
Clothing Food Gifts Education 
Income Variables                 
income(total) 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.40*** -0.71 0.66*** 0.26*** 0.45** 0.60*** 
  6.28 6.01 3.28 -1.33 3.10 6.34 2.28 3.00 
share(female) -0.43 -0.94 0.84 3.71* -0.26 0.00 -2.35* 0.37 
  -0.38 -0.37 0.75 1.67 -0.20 0.00 -1.85 0.21 
square share(female) 0.27 0.17 -0.57 -1.33 -1.7 0.15 1.48 -0.61 
  0.26 0.08 -0.49 -0.98 -0.78 0.27 1.00 -0.4 
share(male) -2.27* -3.16 -0.08 0.91 -3.09 0.87 -2.06* 0.87 
  -1.79 -0.77 -0.07 0.73 -1.45 1.42 -1.75 0.56 
square share(male) 1.44 1.88 0.25 -0.86 1.79 -0.96* 1.05 -0.78 
  1.31 0.56 0.31 -0.83 1.15 -1.89 1.04 -0.55 
Household Characteristics           
household size 0.01 0.05 0 0.18* -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
  0.32 0.79 -0.04 1.96 -1.45 0.5 -0.54 -0.32 
number of childres 0.01 0 0.05 -0.12 0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.08 
  0.19 0 0.48 -1.53 0.98 -0.62 0.79 0.64 
dummy(female head) 0.02 0.06 0.15 1.68** -0.31 -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 
  0.22 0.32 1.33 2.11 -0.82 -0.54 -0.36 -0.77 
dummy(poor) 0.23 0.03 0.86**  -3.66** 0.61  -0.37 1.27* 
  0.4 0.04 1.98 -2 1.38  -0.51 1.77 
Male's Characteristics           
dummy(married) 0.2 0.01 -0.52 -0.83** 0.9 0.09 0.48 0.11 
  0.84 0.02 -0.6 -2.05 1.42 0.67 1.13 0.3 
age(26-45) 0.16 0.09 0.16 -0.62 0.18 0.09 0.1 -0.06 
  0.77 0.44 0.44 -1.48 0.42 0.91 0.3 -0.14 
age(46-65) 0.24 -0.07 0.58 -1.19 0.61* 0.36*** 0.33 0.43 
  0.76 -0.13 0.92 -1.53 1.76 3.01 0.76 0.47 
age(above 66) 0.03 1.39 0.52*   -3.74* -1.19* -0.18 0.08 0.24 
  0.12 0.78 1.9 -1.91 -1.84 -1.12 0.1 0.62 
dummy(student)   -1.32 -0.24 2.80* 1.83  -2.11*   
    -0.92 -0.3 1.82 1.46  -1.68   
dummy(business) -0.1 -0.27 0.25 1.45* 0.36 0.05 0.07 0.3 
  -0.63 -0.71 1.13 1.84 0.71 0.49 0.26 0.73 
dummy(home) -0.42* -0.44 -0.31 -0.5 0.33  -0.45 0.6 
  -1.7 -0.96 -1.26 -1.55 1.02  -0.52 1.24 
dummy(family business) -0.08 -0.27 -0.57 -0.17 1.23 0.24 0.32 0.70* 
  -0.27 -0.68 -0.93 -0.48 1.64 1.52 0.85 1.68 
dummy(dependant) -0.47 -1.07 0.9 -1.13* -0.47  -1.21 0.88 
  -1.01 -0.9 0.67 -1.92 -0.77  -1.44 0.98 
dummy(other activity) -1.03*** 0.01 0.22 -2.47*** -0.39  -0.37 1.27 
  -3.44 0.01 0.54 -3.65 -0.55  -0.78 1.28 
dummy(literate) -0.16 0.03 -0.23 -0.99** 0.06 0 -0.26 -0.01 
  -0.87 0.12 -1.51 -2.44 0.2 -0.02 -1.11 -0.03 
dummy(primary education) -0.21 0.16 -0.49 -0.96** 1.2 0.11 -0.26 -1.18 
  -0.49 0.42 -1.45 -2.13 1.21 0.61 -0.58 -1.6 
dummy(secondary education) -0.04 -0.16 -0.55 -1.37** 1.44 0.25 0.12 -0.89 
  -0.1 -0.35 -1.64 -2.35 1.27 1.38 0.25 -1.14 
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dummy(high school) 0.17 0.14 -0.19 -0.68 1.24 0.24 0.11 -0.6 
  0.38 0.25 -0.46 -1.61 1.45 1.34 0.17 -0.79 
dummy(university) 0.11 0.39 -0.04 -0.08 1.81 0.36* 0.35 0.02 
  0.18 0.6 -0.11 -0.18 1.61 1.74 0.46 0.02 
dummy(other education) 0.19 -0.09 -0.52 -1.96** 2.51 0.34 0.68 0.6 
  0.28 -0.1 -0.96 -2.31 1.4 1.58 0.95 0.86 
Female's Characteristics           
dummy(married) 0.18 -0.19 0.03 -0.91 0.19 -0.14 -0.42 -0.19 
  0.64 -0.24 0.06 -1.61 0.31 -0.71 -1.06 -0.39 
age(26-45) -0.27 -0.14 -0.07 -0.86** 0.84 0.08 0.11 0.28 
  -1.5 -0.25 -0.18 -2.11 1.27 1.25 0.37 0.55 
age(46-65) 0 0.31 0.14 0.87* 0.75 0.03 0.17 0.44 
  -0.01 0.45 0.25 1.7 0.89 0.24 0.2 1.16 
age(above 66) 0.24 0.09 0.37 4.58** -0.51 0.08 -0.19 -0.12 
  0.64 0.26 0.38 2.28 -0.98 0.52 -0.46 -0.2 
dummy(student) 0.13 0.11 0.57*   -2.79** 0.6 0.02 -0.01 0.72 
  0.44 0.28 1.9 -1.98 0.87 0.14 -0.03 1.2 
dummy(business) 0.04 -0.27 -0.22 -0.7 -0.45  -0.36 -0.4 
  0.13 -0.71 -0.53 -1.36 -0.76  -0.68 -0.63 
dummy(home) 0.11 0.16 0.21 1.27** -1.13 0.11 -0.16 0.54 
  0.46 0.56 0.84 2.26 -1.22 0.9 -0.6 1.54 
dummy(family business) 0.55 0.5 0.17 1.10* -0.67 0.16 -0.25 0.75 
  1.59 1.04 0.56 1.94 -0.93 0.86 -0.33 1.48 
dummy(dependant) -0.07 0.23 0.72 -0.08 -0.45 0.18 0.02 0.52 
  -0.26 0.45 1.26 -0.22 -1.17 0.96 0.02 1.02 
dummy(other activity) -0.25 -0.07 -0.6 -2.49** -0.93  -0.32 0.09 
  -0.42 -0.08 -0.82 -2.12 -0.89  -0.46 0.09 
dummy(literate) -0.05 0.22 0.44 -0.15 -1.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 
  -0.19 0.58 1.34 -0.8 -1.24 -0.59 -0.23 0.09 
dummy(primary education) 0.08 0.05 0.5 -0.77 -0.69 0.19 0.06 -0.34 
  0.2 0.09 1.48 -1.55 -1.09 1.32 0.18 -0.72 
dummy(secondary education) 0.25 0.23 0.58*   0.24 -0.65 0.2 0.13 0.42 
  0.66 0.48 1.89 0.74 -0.96 1.31 0.22 0.8 
dummy(high school) 0.29 0.38 0.79**  -0.53 -2.3 0.32** 0.63* 0.77 
  0.56 0.44 2 -0.97 -1.2 1.99 1.69 1.38 
dummy(university) 0.7 0.94 1.18 2.02*** -2.18 0.05 0.66 0.47 
  0.76 0.82 1.02 2.76 -0.89 0.2 0.72 0.63 
dummy(other education) 0.27 0.21 1.22**  2.57** -1.61 0.39* -0.1 0.56 
  0.44 0.24 2.43 2.58 -0.89 1.75 -0.2 0.71 
Mill's Ratios           
mills(girls' clothes)                     10.15**      
                      2.19      
mills(boys' clothes)                      -4.66     
                       -1.24     
mills(food)                       0.08    
                        0.17    
mills(gifts)                        0.37   
                         0.17   
mills(education)         -0.28 
          -0.19 
mills(clothing) 1.06         
  0.61         
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mills(men's clothing)   1.15        
    0.49        
mills(women's clothing)    1.51       
     0.76       
            
constant 3.44*** 3.77* 3.39 25.45** -3.98 6.29*** 4.8 0.37 
  3.01 1.76 1.29 2.4 -0.68 13.39 1.36 0.1 
            
N 760 423 509 372 405 776 384 355 
r2 0.32 0.31 0.4 0.37 0.38 0.29 0.51 0.46 
F 8.29 4.03 7.26 4.57 5.22 8.44 8.61 6.48 
t-ratios below coefficients. Significance Levels: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
 
  Health Hygiene Farm 
Feminine 
Sphere Housing Fuel Other 
Income Variables         
income(total) 0.56*** 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.54*** 0.29*** 0.74*** 
  5.95 3.37 3.75 4.13 9.52 5.96 9.16 
share(female) -1.12 -1.37* -1.53 1.24 -2.18*** -0.88 -2.47* 
  -1 -1.74 -1 1.03 -2.62 -1.17 -1.79 
square share(female) 1.03 1.73** -0.32 -1.52 1.47* 0.17 1.64 
  0.68 2.18 -0.2 -1.51 1.76 0.23 1.14 
share(male) -1.78 0.26 -2.48*   -0.78 -1.81* -1.31* -1.21 
  -0.47 0.26 -1.75 -0.21 -1.89 -1.65 -0.71 
square share(male) 1.23 -0.29 0.2 0.44 0.92 0.33 0.46 
  0.45 -0.33 0.17 0.16 1.09 0.46 0.29 
Household Characteristics         
household size 0 -0.04 -0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.10* 
  0.05 -1.01 -1.35 0.17 0.75 -1.2 -1.78 
number of childres 0.05 0.02 0.20*   -0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.14* 
  0.4 0.47 1.66 -0.84 -0.19 1.48 1.91 
dummy(female head) -0.17 -0.14 0.18 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.22 
  -0.65 -1.53 0.85 -0.33 0.52 -0.83 -1.54 
dummy(poor) 0.64 0.65** 2.15*** 0.02 0.23 ( ) 1.57*** 
  1.24 1.97 2.83 0.05 0.68  3.79 
Male's Characteristics         
dummy(married) 0 0.04 -0.07 0.54 0.4 0.30* -0.08 
  0.01 0.18 -0.18 0.41 1.61 1.88 -0.19 
age(26-45) 0.52* 0.33 -0.06 -0.19 0.29 0.31*** 0.04 
  1.87 1.43 -0.22 -0.95 1.25 2.62 0.16 
age(46-65) 0.69** 0.45** 1.00*** -0.37 0.28 0.22 0.53* 
  1.97 2.51 2.76 -1.39 1.18 1.37 1.75 
age(above 66) 0.15 0.12 0.92**  0.39 0.29 -0.07 0.51 
  0.36 0.64 2.34 0.6 1.15 -0.43 1.64 
dummy(student)   1.95 -0.98 0.37    
    1.6 -1.1 0.4    
dummy(business) -0.13 -0.23 -0.05 0.22 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 
  -0.22 -1.41 -0.19 0.69 -0.44 -0.51 0.12 
dummy(home) -0.05 -0.19 0.22 -0.15 -1.06*** -0.12 -0.78** 
  -0.12 -0.73 0.45 -0.44 -4.23 -0.66 -2.03 
dummy(family business) 0.32 0.02 -3.14*** 0.24 0.1 0.06 -0.14 
  0.47 0.1 -3.23 0.4 0.41 0.29 -0.41 
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dummy(dependant) -1.16  -0.62 -1.97*** -0.29    
  -0.78  -0.77 -3.33 -0.64    
dummy(other activity) -0.28 -0.51 -1.37 -1.27** -0.15 -0.33 -0.69 
  -0.4 -1.62 -1.33 -2.54 -0.51 -1.35 -1.19 
dummy(literate) -0.50** -0.25* 1.55*** -0.27 0.01 -0.18 0.52** 
  -2.04 -1.74 3.12 -1.55 0.06 -1.61 2.3 
dummy(primary education) -0.35 -0.59** 2.47*** -0.19 0 -0.2 1.27*** 
  -0.86 -2.02 3.09 -0.21 0.01 -0.98 3.21 
dummy(secondary education) 0.01 -0.59 2.55*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.09 1.30*** 
  0.01 -1.58 3.16 0.02 -0.05 -0.4 3.12 
dummy(high school) -0.28 -0.37 1.99*** 0.23 0.33 0.19 1.37*** 
  -0.52 -1.23 2.66 0.3 1.16 0.86 3.33 
dummy(university) -0.3 -0.4 1.70*   0.11 0.24 0.28 1.44*** 
  -0.59 -1.14 1.93 0.18 0.69 1.17 2.93 
dummy(other education) 0.01 0.13 1.29 0.03 0.24 0.36 1.99*** 
  0.02 0.39 1.61 0.03 0.72 1.37 3.99 
Female's Characteristics         
dummy(married) 0.38 -0.24 0.12 -0.01 -0.23 -0.27 0.38 
  0.82 -0.98 0.25 -0.03 -0.76 -1.27 0.86 
age(26-45) 0.15 0.02 0.23 -0.34 0.1 0.16* -0.11 
  0.36 0.19 1.17 -0.57 0.87 1.9 -0.71 
age(46-65) 0.41 -0.03 0.1 -0.47 0.22 0.22 -0.58** 
  0.69 -0.11 0.3 -0.55 1.12 1.54 -2.11 
age(above 66) 0.29 0.09 0.42 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.17 
  0.44 0.24 0.73 0.05 -0.4 -0.07 -0.47 
dummy(student) 0.61 -0.32 -0.46 -0.29 -0.02 0.08 0.17 
  1.63 -1.3 -0.96 -1 -0.08 0.41 0.48 
dummy(business) -0.24 -0.22 0.95*   -0.14 -0.51 -0.44**   
  -0.48 -0.9 1.82 -0.16 -1.07 -2.16   
dummy(home) 0.17 -0.13 0.07 -0.37 -0.21 0.16 -0.46* 
  0.3 -0.69 0.2 -1.27 -1.16 1.15 -1.68 
dummy(family business) 0.59 -0.26 -0.66 0.12 -0.15 0.35 0.5 
  1.43 -0.88 -0.81 0.35 -0.46 1.64 1.22 
dummy(dependant) 0.73* 0.12 0.03 -0.44 -0.37 0.18 0.15 
  1.94 0.35 0.05 -0.97 -1.39 0.83 0.35 
dummy(other activity) 0.38 0.24  0.42 0.74    
  0.24 0.43               0.48 1.09    
dummy(literate) -0.18 0.08 -0.15 0.16 -0.16 -0.08 -0.02 
  -0.99 0.73 -0.51 0.75 -1.21 -0.77 -0.12 
dummy(primary education) -0.61 0.21 0.45 0.40* -0.54** -0.1 0 
  -1.34 1.08 0.69 1.69 -2.25 -0.59 0.01 
dummy(secondary education) -0.35 0.19 0.22 0.24 -0.1 0.11 0.18 
  -1.09 0.91 0.33 0.9 -0.42 0.63 0.54 
dummy(high school) 0.09 0.46* 0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.87** 
  0.25 1.9 0.3 -0.05 0.08 0.33 2.39 
dummy(university) 0.22 1.68** 0.56 0.01 0.43 0.24 1.2 
  0.45 2.19 0.79 0.01 0.63 0.73 1.53 
dummy(other education) -0.2 0.46 -2.27 1.00** 0.42 0.03 1.13** 
  -0.29 1.22 -1.52 2.23 1.06 0.11 2.26 
Mill's Ratios         
mills(other)                    0.03 
                     0.02 
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mills(health) 1.3                     
  0.33                     
mills(hygiene)  1.7                    
   1                    
mills(farm)   -2.99**       
    -2.56      
mills(femsphere)    -2.13     
     -0.5     
mills(housing)     -0.49    
      -0.32    
mills(fuel)      -0.5   
       -0.69   
constant 1.47 4.07*** -3.22 1.57 3.07*** 5.12*** -0.58 
  0.6 5.6 -1.13 0.3 4.07 9.28 -0.54 
          
N 643 797 202 586 806 825 817 
r2 0.33 0.2 0.43 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.37 
F 7.26 4.84 2.92 5.11 11.33 11.09 11.83 
t-ratios below coefficients. Significance Levels: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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Table 3b: First Stage Probit Regression Results: Likelihood of Household having Positive Consumption of each 
Category of Good 
 
  
Clothing 
(Total) 
Men's 
Clothing 
Women's 
Clothing 
Girls' 
Clothing 
Boy's 
Clothing Food Gifts Education 
Income Variables          
income(total) 0.08 0 0.09 0.17*** 0.09 -0.37*** 0.13** 0.19*** 
  1.19 0.06 1.61 2.97 1.51 -2.75 2.23 3.23 
share(female) -1.2 -1.43 -0.63 -0.61 0.31 -1.12 0.41 -1.49* 
  -1.29 -1.57 -0.74 -0.74 0.37 -0.58 0.48 -1.73 
square share(female) 0.87 1.13 0.65 0.23 -0.77 1.06 -0.59 0.47 
  0.95 1.17 0.76 0.28 -0.93 0.57 -0.7 0.55 
share(male) 1.36 2.63*** -0.43 -0.2 -0.67 2.92 -0.04 -0.72 
  1.44 2.91 -0.51 -0.24 -0.83 1.34 -0.05 -0.8 
square share(male) -1.23 -2.19*** 0.17 0.14 0.48 -2.64 -0.3 -0.73 
Household Characteristics          
household size -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0 -0.01 0 -0.06 
  -0.57 -0.49 0.91 -0.62 0.06 -0.1 -0.06 -1.29 
number of childres -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 
  -0.34 -0.76 -1.53 0.22 -0.39 -0.5 -0.76 0.91 
dummy(female head) -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.25** -0.14 0.12 -0.11 0 
  -0.28 0.74 -0.23 -2.37 -1.36 0.5 -1.01 -0.03 
dummy(poor) 0.87** 0.42 0.27 0.32 -0.22  0.07 -0.33 
  2.42 1.48 0.99 0.56 -0.41  0.12 -1 
Male's Characteristics -1.51 -2.85 0.24 0.19 0.68 -1.5 -0.42 -0.97 
dummy(married) 0.21 -0.21 0.70*** 0.09 0.24 1.31* -0.24 0.24 
  0.9 -0.93 3.42 0.46 1.17 1.65 -1.15 1.15 
age(26-45) -0.22 -0.07 -0.31**  0.11 0.14 -0.47 0.2 0.25 
  -1.2 -0.48 -1.97 0.68 0.91 -0.79 1.28 1.33 
age(46-65) -0.39* -0.3 -0.53*** 0.23 0.09 -0.55 0.26 0.89*** 
  -1.77 -1.56 -2.76 1.22 0.47 -0.88 1.32 4.12 
age(above 66) 0 -0.96*** 0.1 0.62*** -0.21 1.30** -0.52** 0.06 
  0.02 -3.4 0.45 2.95 -0.99 2.02 -2.23 0.27 
dummy(student)  -0.57 0.26 0.57** 0.04  0.42   
   -0.67 0.32 2.12 0.14  1.53   
dummy(business) 0.04 0.22 -0.13 -0.32 0.1  -0.31 -0.32* 
  0.23 1.4 -0.85 -0.4 0.12  -0.41 -1.78 
dummy(home) 0.05 0.1 0.02 -0.24 0.2 1.03 -0.14 -0.12 
  0.19 0.35 0.09 -1.5 1.31 1.6 -0.86 -0.45 
dummy(family business) 0.32 0.07 0.52**  0 0.03  -0.51* 0.05 
  1.04 0.27 1.98 -0.01 0.12  -1.94 0.17 
dummy(dependant) 0.24 0.82* -0.92*   0.02 0.28 0.39 0.15 -0.45 
  0.47 1.75 -1.79 0.09 1.12 0.64 0.61 -0.94 
dummy(other activity) 0.15 -0.28 -0.22 0.05 0.09  -0.33 -0.56 
  0.43 -0.89 -0.76 0.11 0.22  -0.71 -1.55 
dummy(literate) 0.18 -0.1 0 0.2 0.26  -0.12 0.22 
  1.03 -0.63 0.02 0.69 0.91  -0.4 1.3 
dummy(primary education) 0.48 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.5 
  1.52 0.16 0.47 0.74 0.59 0.08 0.44 1.54 
dummy(secondary education) 0.44 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.35 -0.41 0.17 0.57* 
  1.33 0.59 0.42 0.3 1.23 -0.51 0.58 1.72 
dummy(high school) 0.47 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.41 -0.19 0.16 0.52 
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  1.43 0.87 0.78 0.48 1.39 -0.24 0.53 1.59 
dummy(university) 0.69* 0.32 0.12 0.04 0.29 -0.03 0.35 0.80** 
  1.85 0.94 0.37 0.14 0.96 -0.03 1.18 2.19 
dummy(other education) 0.88** 0.57 0.32 -0.05 0.4 0.17 0.46 0.28 
Female's Characteristics 2.19 1.57 0.9 -0.14 1.21 0.21 1.38 0.74 
dummy(married) 0.04 0.42 0.37 0.24 0.72** -0.13 0.36 -0.07 
  0.15 1.4 1.41 0.69 2.03 -0.15 1.03 -0.26 
age(26-45) -0.23* -0.37*** -0.33*** 0.13 0.18 0.36 -0.13 0.43*** 
  -1.83 -3.46 -3.1 0.49 0.66 0.42 -0.49 3.63 
age(46-65) -0.37* -0.44** -0.45**  0.12 0.25** -0.49 -0.19* 0.05 
  -1.78 -2.15 -2.38 1.13 2.38 -1.34 -1.74 0.26 
age(above 66) -0.44* 0 -0.71*** -0.15 0.32* -0.77 -0.58*** 0.44* 
  -1.66 -0.02 -2.85 -0.78 1.72 -1.56 -2.91 1.69 
dummy(student) 0.22 0.07 0.03 -0.29 -0.73** 0.91 0.03 0.42* 
  0.84 0.27 0.11 -0.82 -2.06 1.16 0.08 1.7 
dummy(business) -0.1 -0.03 -0.23 0.44* 0.21 1.03* 0.12 -0.28 
  -0.32 -0.11 -0.85 1.76 0.83 1.84 0.49 -0.93 
dummy(home) -0.2 -0.04 -0.13 0.11 -0.19  0.28 -0.19 
  -0.99 -0.19 -0.71 0.42 -0.7  1.05 -1.04 
dummy(family business) -0.26 -0.13 0.12 -0.17 -0.36** 0.06 -0.09 0.16 
  -0.85 -0.43 0.42 -0.94 -2.02 0.17 -0.5 0.55 
dummy(dependant) -0.13 -0.16 -0.39 -0.13 -0.24 0.1 0.46 0.15 
  -0.43 -0.56 -1.4 -0.46 -0.84 0.15 1.62 0.53 
dummy(other activity) 0.33 0.21 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.53* 0.38 
  0.51 0.39 0.1 0.07 -0.14 0.51 -1.84 0.65 
dummy(literate) -0.33** -0.24* -0.26**  -0.62** -0.15 0.55 -0.26 -0.14 
  -2.19 -1.81 -2 -2.53 -0.62 0.81 -1.05 -0.96 
dummy(primary education) -0.54* -0.44* -0.26 0.03 -0.33** 0.46 0.07 -0.09 
  -1.89 -1.88 -1.12 0.21 -2.55 1.16 0.53 -0.36 
dummy(secondary education) -0.52* -0.29 -0.2 0.12 -0.22 0.77 -0.04 0.22 
  -1.7 -1.13 -0.81 0.55 -0.99 1.4 -0.2 0.83 
dummy(high school) -0.73** -0.59** -0.29 0 -0.23 0.49 0.35 0.31 
  -2.23 -2.19 -1.08 -0.01 -0.97 0.87 1.44 1.1 
dummy(university) -1.23*** -0.76** -0.91**  0.13 -0.76*** 0.59 -0.03 -0.54 
  -3.03 -2.07 -2.5 0.51 -2.92 1 -0.11 -1.48 
dummy(other education) -0.84** -0.52 -0.33 -0.18 -0.98*** -0.18 0.72** 0.66* 
  -2.01 -1.43 -0.92 -0.53 -2.8 -0.27 1.99 1.7 
constant 0.55 0.1 -0.7 -2.18*** -1.16* 4.26** -1.11 -2.10*** 
  0.7 0.14 -0.99 -3.09 -1.66 2.34 -1.57 -2.81 
           
N 948 951 951 951 951 806 951 948 
t-statistics below coefficients; significance Levels: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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Feminine 
Sphere Housing Fuel Other Health Hygiene Farm 
Income Variables         
income(total) 0.03 0 -0.18** -0.04 -0.03 -0.15** 0.1 
  0.54 0 -2.01 -0.42 -0.5 -2.26 1.57 
share(female) 0.32 0.19 -3.40** -2.04 -0.12 -0.24 0.33 
  0.39 0.19 -2.01 -1.56 -0.14 -0.24 0.36 
square share(female) 0.03 -0.05 2.95** 2.06* 0.55 0.15 -0.84 
  0.04 -0.05 2.01 1.67 0.64 0.16 -0.91 
share(male) 1.46* 1.01 2.72* 2.87** 1.89** 1.15 -0.69 
  1.79 1.01 1.65 2.13 2.19 1.14 -0.75 
square share(male) -1.1 -0.97 -3.41** -2.88** -1.38* -0.96 0.01 
Household Characteristics         
household size 0 0 -0.08 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09*   
  0.08 -0.05 -1.3 0.06 -0.85 -0.73 -1.87 
number of childres -0.04 0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 
  -0.77 0.45 1.34 -0.41 0.99 0.14 1.3 
dummy(female head) -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 
  -0.44 -0.39 -0.83 0.31 -1.09 0.24 -0.27 
dummy(poor) 0.05 -0.27   0.83 0.22            
  0.19 -0.92   1.24 0.34            
Male's Characteristics -1.57 -1.11 -2.41 -2.42 -1.85 -1.1 0.01 
dummy(married) 0.53*** -0.31 0.43 0.99** 0.22 0.12 -0.18 
  2.61 -1.24 1.09 2.21 1.06 0.49 -0.77 
age(26-45) -0.05 0.33* -0.38 0.41* -0.1 -0.39* -0.08 
  -0.33 1.88 -1.25 1.92 -0.63 -1.85 -0.44 
age(46-65) -0.07 0.26 -0.64* 0.36 0.12 -0.14 0.15 
  -0.35 1.12 -1.85 1.23 0.63 -0.55 0.7 
age(above 66) 0.24 0.22 0.32 0.04 0.13 0.03 -0.12 
  1.16 0.88 0.77 0.12 0.61 0.1 -0.5 
dummy(student) 0.07 -0.54  0.31 0.2 -0.39 0.88*** 
  0.09 -0.66  0.6 0.7 -1.16 3 
dummy(business) 0.12 0.12 0.32    1.45 
  0.74 0.62 1.03    1.41 
dummy(home) 0.08 0 0.01 0.16 0.33* 0.18 -0.04 
  0.32 0.01 0.03 0.6 1.95 0.87 -0.26 
dummy(family business) -0.2 0.03 -0.3 0.52 -0.11 -0.18 0.44*   
  -0.79 0.1 -0.79 1.19 -0.44 -0.66 1.71 
dummy(dependant) -0.11 0.42  0.3 0.3 0.08 -0.77**  
  -0.26 0.64  0.71 1.13 0.26 -2.04 
dummy(other activity) -0.14 -0.07 -0.43  0.94  0.01 
  -0.5 -0.21 -0.94  1.54  0.02 
dummy(literate) 0.02 -0.30* -0.27 -0.71** -0.27 0.38 -0.90**  
  0.11 -1.65 -1 -2.03 -0.96 0.91 -2.03 
dummy(primary education) 0.35 -0.54 0.08 0.23 -0.07 0.12 0.59*** 
  1.25 -1.52 0.16 0.93 -0.44 0.61 3.23 
dummy(secondary education) 0.39 -0.48 0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.3 0.94**  
  1.34 -1.3 0.13 0.1 -0.28 0.85 2.55 
dummy(high school) 0.28 -0.03 0.29 0.18 -0.27 0.56 0.90**  
  0.96 -0.07 0.58 0.41 -0.88 1.51 2.37 
dummy(university) 0.18 -0.28 0.11 0.12 -0.19 0.29 0.75**  
  0.56 -0.65 0.2 0.27 -0.62 0.78 1.96 
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dummy(other education) 0.43 0.11 0.48 0.36 -0.14 0.37 0.90**  
Female's Characteristics 1.25 0.23 0.8 0.71 -0.41 0.92 2.12 
dummy(married) -0.12 0.34 0.35 0.21 -0.16 0.06 0.68 
  -0.45 1.06 0.74 0.39 -0.46 0.13 1.49 
age(26-45) -0.25** -0.09 -0.12 -0.98* 0.11 -0.11 -0.05 
  -2.34 -0.64 -0.68 -1.9 0.43 -0.33 -0.16 
age(46-65) -0.35* -0.09 0 -0.01 -0.20* 0.03 -0.03 
  -1.89 -0.38 0.02 -0.03 -1.79 0.23 -0.25 
age(above 66) -0.16 0.29 0.56 -0.15 -0.26 -0.36 0.04 
  -0.67 0.92 1.28 -0.51 -1.36 -1.59 0.2 
dummy(student) -0.04 0.05 0.45 -0.1 0.3 0.39 -0.95 
  -0.17 0.16 1.13 -0.19 0.81 0.88 -1.44 
dummy(business) 0.39 -0.61** 0.3 0.3 0.06 0.13 -0.11 
  1.39 -2.05 0.57 0.85 0.24 0.45 -0.37 
dummy(home) -0.09 -0.07 0.05  -0.17 -0.05 0.56*   
  -0.49 -0.31 0.18  -0.6 -0.17 1.92 
dummy(family business) -0.03 -0.31 0.19 0.23 -0.25 0.13 -0.05 
  -0.11 -0.93 0.39 0.86 -1.41 0.64 -0.23 
dummy(dependant) -0.11 0.04 -0.09 0.23 -0.06 -0.17 -0.4 
  -0.41 0.11 -0.23 0.53 -0.21 -0.52 -1.1 
dummy(other activity) 0.24 -0.52  0.36 0 -0.32 -0.1 
  0.46 -0.9  0.84 -0.01 -1.05 -0.33 
dummy(literate) -0.06 -0.05 0.52* -0.26 -0.28 -0.50* -0.25 
  -0.52 -0.35 1.88 -0.7 -1.17 -1.76 -0.85 
dummy(primary education) 0.01 -0.18 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0 0.29*   
  0.05 -0.67 0.13 -0.4 -0.3 0 1.83 
dummy(secondary education) -0.03 0.17 0.09 -0.09 0.18 0.06 0.67**  
  -0.1 0.55 0.21 -0.24 0.8 0.2 2.25 
dummy(high school) -0.07 -0.34 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.67**  
  -0.26 -1.06 -0.21 -0.03 0.16 0.15 2.1 
dummy(university) -0.29 -1.00** -0.73 0.12 -0.05 -0.07 0.16 
  -0.85 -2.47 -1.43 0.28 -0.19 -0.21 0.46 
dummy(other education) -0.07 -0.42 0.24 -1.01** -0.04 -0.74* -0.01 
  -0.2 -0.95 0.4 -2.04 -0.12 -1.8 -0.02 
constant -0.69 1.33 3.57*** 1.21 0.4 2.48*** -2.31*** 
  -0.99 1.57 2.81 1.08 0.56 2.92 -2.73 
          
N 951 951 892 889 948 938 944 
t-statistics below coefficients; significance Levels: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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